The physical, symbolical appearance and phonetic sound of word may be the same, but the meaning remains ambiguous, just as in the duck-rabbit picture, wherein the basic physical structure and shape of the drawing is the same, but the apparent picture is ambiguous. What could Wittgenstein mean by this assertion? With Karl Johnson, Michael Gough, Tilda Swinton, John Quentin. And since the meaning of this statement, according to proponents of this movement in philosophy, is the mode of empirically verifying its truth or falsity, such meaning must be put in terms of the method in which statement's truth or falsity is determined. Is there really an external world? The problem, of course, lies in using the word 'interpretation' to denote the unconscious processing of sensory data in the brain. As Wittgenstein puts it, interpreting is an action. .' Wittgenstein, Ludwig. This sort of conceptualization of how the brain works unconsciously by way of a leap of association is the result of the personification of the brain as a conscious, sentient entity in itself. Again, we can rely on Russell to lend his support to this idea: There are in fact no illusions of the senses, but only mistakes in interpreting sensational data as signs of things other than themselves. Our eyes do not 'see', we do. In the following sections we will examine where Wittgenstein seems to believe that the philosophy of psychology, in regard to the senses, has gone astray. In Russell's defense, we could say that it is a drawing of the same shape, a specific conglomeration of lines and curves, or something to that effect, but this seems trivial and unsatisfying to us--almost as if we were to say that the proper object of sense in this case is a "thing". For example, to interpret the figure as a brick, we might imagine it with an earthen color and a rough texture. is connected with 'I'm trying to see it as . Wittgenstein, Ludwig. There is no verification for 'hearing' in this case, and there are no interpretations being made. And if they were to be deemed meaningless, then how could any form of empirical verification be meaningful when empirical verification in itself is in fact wholly dependent upon statements which declare sensory observations (i.e., "I see where the optic nerve attaches to the brain")? The data that the senses acquire and deliver to the brain via electrical impulses along the body's nervous system, as current psychological theories dictate, is manifested in the brain in the form of unorganized percepts (which can be considered another form of data). Furthermore, it is surely true that we can 'see', as there are very few things that could seem more obvious. If to 'interpret' is a habit in this sense of the term, then Russell seems to be conceptualizing the word 'interpretation' in a manner which includes unconscious or subconscious processes in the brain as part of its meaning. Goldfarb, Warren. Such people have no need for pitch-pipes, since they can tune an instrument by simply listening to it and 'hearing' whether or not it is in tune. In order to help make sense of Wittgenstein's remarks, it becomes imperative to further and more thoroughly explicate the traditional philosophical views to which he seems to be objecting. --I couldn't answer: 'I take that to be a . In this case, it involves observing the physical structure and mechanics of the eyes, optic nerves, and the region of the brain to which they attach, as well as the physical laws regarding the behavior of light. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Wittgenstein’s seeing as . Rescuing Wollheim's account without the support of Wittgenstein --pt. The above figure is meant to show, as are the ones soon to be discussed, that there are in fact illusions of the senses and thus to conceptualize seeing (as well as any other sensory experience) simply as a process of absorbing and interpreting 'data' is to terribly confuse the idea of what it actually means to 'see'. . The customary usage of the word cannot account for this consideration, because it would seem obvious to us that seeing does not always require conscious inferences. In §1 of the Remarks, for instance, Wittgenstein begins by presenting us with the above figure which can be seen in two different ways. 1958. pp. . But to be able to give an account of what it is to 'believe', 'desire', 'understand', or 'see' (in the sense it has been discussed in this essay) is an entirely different matter. .' Is that really what it means to walk? Wittgenstein's claims, it should be noted, have the same implications for our other senses as well. (The draft of water, the draft of a treaty.) We mentally embellish the object in a way which conforms to what we believe the object is or may be meant to represent. Even some prominent thinkers misunderstand Wittgenstein's ideas, as evidenced by the fact that many perceive of him as subscribing to philosophical schools of thought with which he would want no affiliation. Seeing the duck-rabbit figure as a duck, or as a rabbit, is therefore much like having perfect pitch, in that there are no active inferences being made. Modern science, particularly psychology, tries to shed light on the question of how we can be said to see, hear, taste, smell, and feel in terms of theories which explain how sensations become perceptions. The duck and the rabbit both seem to impress themselves upon us in some eery, inexplicable manner. This is also a very good case of what Wittgenstein meant by the concept of internal relations in the Tractatus. It is known that he even repudiated the schools of thought which he himself had influenced, such as logical positivism and the "Oxford School" of linguistic philosophy. It is easy to describe the cases in which we are right to say we interpret what we see, as such-and-such. I t was Ludwig Wittgenstein who sparked philosophical interest in what psychologists call ambiguous figures. It is then the job of the brain to somehow organize this perceptual data, (there is still no scientific consensus as to how the brain is said to perform this function) into a recognizable perception. Instead it is composed of myriad fragments that loosely overlap and intersect. Scientific examination is simply not applicable in such a case. Since Wittgenstein's ideas seem to elude classification so thoroughly, it is difficult to refer to them as anything but 'Wittgensteinian'. Now, let us say that we are familiar with both ducks and rabbits, and can therefore recognize both aspects of the duck-rabbit image. It is not very clear what he means by "habit" in this account, and his use of the word will be discussed in detail later in this essay. Furthermore, to try to give a theoretical account of what it is to 'see'--to put it in terms, as discussed earlier in this essay, which describe the physical processes undergone by the respective areas in the body--is akin to giving a theoretical account of what it is to walk. As Wittgenstein writes in the above sections, he takes 'interpretation' to be an action in which we make a conjecture or an inference, which may end up being false. Broadly speaking, a perceptive experience is a dogmatic belief in what physics and induction show to be probable; it is wrong in its dogmatism, but usually right in its content. Wittgenstein's opening remark is double-barreled: he states thatthe field of aesthetics is both very big and entirely misunderstood. To say that we 'see' something can stand on its own two feet, without the need for verification by any further supporting account. Within this rough separation, the chapter looks at various types of drawings involved and the various concepts Wittgenstein discusses in those contexts. Directed by Derek Jarman. The best that the rest of us can do is to try and remember certain pitches and make an inference by attempting to match what we hear with what we remember having heard in the past. This is the trap into which traditional philosophy has fallen: to maintain that the eyes 'see' and the ears 'hear', and that we, as brains, consciously as well as unconsciously interpret the information that we receive from the sensory apparati that are positioned throughout the bodies in which we reside. yet'. . Let me indulge in a final cavil, then, one which I’ve already intimated. A dramatization, in modern theatrical style, of the life and thought of the Viennese-born, Cambridge-educated philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), whose principal interest was the nature and limits of language. To interpret it as a wire frame, we imagine that the sides of the figure are not solid, and that the lines are made out of thin metal wire. Any more than I take letters to be this or that when I'm reading a book. . (7). The case of seeing aspects seems that, at least for particular kinds of drawings, the aspects must somehow already be contained in the picture. Modern philosophers of the traditional vein, in their attempts to align the study of philosophy with the methodological commitments of science, have come under this aforementioned presupposition that the brain is really the "I" and the eyes do the seeing for it. In 1908 he began his studies in aeronauticalengineering at Manchester University where his interest in thephilosophy of pure mathematics led him to Frege. The brain is merely another organ in the body, the purpose of which is to facilitate the various things that human bodies do, such as thinking, walking, seeing, desiring, and interpreting. University of Chicago Press. Science can tell us how the eyes and nerves work, what kind of chemicals are released in the brain, how much electrical activity is occurring in what part of the brain under what stimuli, and so on. These essays show that aspect-seeing was not simply one more topic of investigation in Wittgenstein's later writings, but, rather, that it was a pervasive and guiding concept in his efforts to turn philosophy's attention to the actual conditions of our common life in … A survey of various contexts. When we normally speak of seeing in our everyday language-game, we are not inclined to say, "I see the picture as a duck," but rather we simply say, "I see a duck.". Where Socrates says, “Virtue is knowledge,” Dr. Verdi’s Wittgenstein says, “Ethics is aspect-seeing,” an ingrained appreciation of alternate possibilities and the respect that goes with it. This is the introduction to Seeing Wittgenstein Anew, eds. When we see the figure one way instead of the other, we are not actively producing an interpretation of it, but rather our seeing it one way or another is an expression of our visual experience. T The phrase “seeing as” became a staple of philosophical vocabulary, and various uses were made of it. A series of sketches depict the unfolding of his life from boyhood, … 2. In other words, we each exist as a brain in a vat--and in our case our bodies are the vats. In more specific terms, we become passive observers to the different aspects that the object seems to take on as we view it. (In the same way we tell someone: "Go into the shop and buy . 30990675 Howick Place | London | SW1P 1WG © 2020 Informa UK Limited, Wollheim, Wittgenstein, and Pictorial Representation. Benefits from Wollheim's borrowing from Wittgenstein --pt. In this paper, I consider one such challenge. Let it be this: When we look at the figure, our eyes scan it repeatedly, always following a particular path. In the first part, the remarks are rarely more than a paragraph long and are numbered sequentially by paragraph. He wants to show us that some concepts are in need of clarification before they can be properly examined or determined to be worth examining at all: For Wittgenstein, it is characteristic of the notions that figure in philosophical problems--prominently, mental concepts and linguistic concepts like meaning--that a structure is imposed on them, without grounding in the ordinary use of these notions and without being noticed, when they are taken to be amenable to certain explanatory projects. Either way we wish to look at it, a verificationist is forced to give some kind of theoretical account like the one above, or else abandon his program altogether. Wittgenstein is particularly troubled by this sort of theoretical reduction of what we can be said to be doing when we say we see something. Russell, Bertrand. In the duck-rabbit picture, there are no active inferences being made, no conjecture as to what we see. . Seeing Wittgenstein Anew is a stimulating presentation of a wide-ranging and sophisticated perspective, rigorous and yet generous with argumentative opponents, and making a significant contribution to the literature on the Wittgenstein's later thought as a whole. An interpretation or inference is a conscious action which is performed over and above what happens when we 'see' something. Wittgenstein’s seeing as book. When we say that we see something, we are expressing a belief that a specific perception is apparent to us, wherein no alternative perceptions are relevant. With such confusions concerning the concept of 'interpretation' hopefully now behind us, we can more readily turn our attention to the discussion of what it is to 'see'. My doubt, in particular, is that Russell would actually mean such silliness by his use of the word "habit." It is like describing how messages from the brain tell one foot to place itself in front of the other in such and such a fashion, in what manner the knees, ankles, and toes bend, etc., etc., and claiming that such an account of the mechanics of human bipedal locomotion is what it is to walk. ): (1) a bundle of specific light frequencies is entering my eyes and is being refracted through the lenses, registering on my rods and cones; (2) the eyes are now sending this data by electrochemical signals along the optic nerve to my brain; (3) such data is now spontaneously interpreted, based upon inductive familiarity with similar bundles of data in the past, and determined to indicate the presence of a cat. Our ears do not 'hear', we do, and so on. In other words, we are constantly inferring from what our eyes 'see' without even thinking about it. He has been referred to as a behaviorist, a skeptic, a verificationist, and is even thought by some to be a practitioner of a sort of a priori anti-science. For instance, the statement, "God exists," simply has no meaning since it cannot be empirically verified to be true or false. This is because the scientific, empirical account of how we see--that is, strictly speaking, how the respective parts of the body work together--is based solely upon observations of the workings of the human body, vis-à-vis, how the eyes, nerves, and brain function in relation to the laws of physics. In our language game, we use intentional or action concepts to describe what we do. . This chapter gives some kind of survey of the various contexts in which Wittgenstein discusses the phenomenon of 'seeing as'. Upon a careful and painstaking reading of the rather cryptic and difficult passages within Ludwig Wittgenstein's Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, any reasonably intelligent person might still be left wondering what this obscure Austrian thinker might possibly be attempting to convey. Therefore the brain is thought of as making interpretations on both the conscious and the unconscious level. It would almost seem that interpretations for the above figure in particular are limited only by the limits of the observer's imagination, since it appears completely solitary with virtually no contextual clues, aside from its shape, which might rule various interpretations out. Usually the experiment succeeds; when it does not, its failure is easily accounted for without modifying the laws of physics. A scientific explanation of 'seeing' will only be a physiological one, which in turn cannot explain, cannot penetrate into the brute fact of the experience of 'seeing' the figure as a duck and then as a rabbit, for example. If someone says that he knows by introspection that it is a case of 'seeing', the answer is: 'And how do I know what you are calling introspection? Induction allows us to infer that this pattern of light, which, we will suppose, looks like a cat, probably proceeds from a region in which the other properties of cats are also present. ', or 'I can't see it as . What can we say of those who have what is called "perfect pitch"? . In respect to Russell's claim, vis-à-vis, that there are no illusions of the senses, only mistakes in interpreting sensational data, how would seeing the ambiguous figure one way or other be a mistake? 3. Relative to ourselves, it would seem, the essence of the universe around us is to all effects and purposes mere data: lines, shapes, colors, light emissions, textures, etc. In ordinary everyday life, however, there are many things for which only one interpretation is correct or the most plausible, such as when a person infers that there is a UFO hovering in the night sky and it turns out that it is only the planet Venus. So why call it 'interpreting'? "Wittgenstein on Understanding". Wittgenstein pointed to the epistemological significance of puzzle pictures, such as the ambiguous “duck-rabbit” that can be seen either as a duck’s head facing one way or a rabbit’s head facing another way. As a result, for Wittgenstein scientism is just as misguidedly metaphysical as traditional, more transparently a prioristic, approaches. DOI link for Wittgenstein’s seeing as. Thus, it is unacceptable to a positivist to allow that 'seeing' can be conceptualized as simply something which we do, as something which can stand on its own two feet, without need of verification by a further supporting account. Therefore, 'seeing', or 'seeing as' is simply an experience which neither has nor needs any kind of theoretical verification. Wittgenstein then goes on to ask: "what does seeing the figure now this way and now that consist in?" The basic evil of Russell's logic, as also of mine in the Tractatus, is that what a proposition is is illustrated by a few commonplace examples, and then pre-supposed as understood in full generality. 'Seeing-in' is an imaginative act of the kind employed by Leonardo’s pupils when he told them to see what they could - for example, battle scenes - in a wall of cracked plaster. 17e, 11. I. There does not seem to be, however, anything that we can point to in this regard. And unless we wish to say that the unconscious, mechanistic processing of sensory 'data' in the brain can sometimes be "mistaken" in the way that a hypothesis can, we seem to have to admit that this usage of the word does not account for mistakes or ambiguities in perception. So the meaning of the statement, "I see a cat," will lie in a purely physical account of the process that is played out by our sensory apparati and our brain, which can be dryly provided as something like the following (yes, why not hash it over one more time? A theoretical account of 'hearing' that is along the same lines as the account of 'seeing' would thus not seem appropriate, particularly in light of this phenomenon of perfect pitch. The fact that there are illusions of the senses, contrary to what Russell claims, somehow revolts against the idea that every object of sense contains root data that the brain merely interprets in different ways. When I'm looking at the photograph, I don't tell myself 'That could be seen as a human being'. Volume II. These essays show that aspect-seeing was not simply one more topic of investigation in Wittgenstein's later writings, but, rather, that it was a pervasive and guiding concept in his efforts to turn philosophy's attention to the actual conditions of our common life in language. References to sections in Part I will use a number sign (i.e., #). In other words, if a verificationist cannot provide an empirically verifiable, theoretical account of what it is to 'see', then the entire verificationist project is dead because the means of verification itself will be rendered unverifiable. I. Wittgenstein and seeing-as --pt. William Day & Victor J. Krebs (Cambridge UP, 2010), a collection of essays on Ludwig Wittgenstein's remarks on aspect-seeing. Science and traditional philosophy try to provide a physiological account of these concepts. V. Imagination and emotion … Such a person is still, in some degree, making a conscious inference. How is that possible? Our eyes are not simply tools used by the brain which do the 'seeing' for it. 176. We see it as two entirely different, alternating images, despite the fact that the drawing itself does not at all change. Wittgenstein then goes … What do we see when we observe the above figure? Philosophers of psychology, in their efforts to determine theoretically what it is to 'see', or to provide a theoretical account of what it means to speak of 'seeing' something, have become tied up in this empirical, scientific picture. In the preface, Wittgenstein describes his failure to synthesize his points into a unified work. One would simply say, "I see an airplane." Philosophical Investigations is divided into two parts, consisting of what Wittgenstein calls, in the preface, Bemerkungen, translated by Anscombe as "remarks". .' Wittgenstein wants to begin by attempting to clarify what can properly be called a case of interpreting. 2020 Internet Infidels Fundraising Drive / $33,018.52 of $40,000.00. Let us put it another way. Sharing the same physical location in space does not make it so that the word to denote the objects can be used to mean both concepts at once. When we see the figure one way instead of the other, we are not actively producing an interpretation of it, but rather our seeing it one way or another is an expression of our visual experience. Registered in England & Wales No. In other words, when we are observing a singular object that is quite familiar and seemingly unmistakable to us, we simply see it, without any need for conjecture or inference. upon Ludwig Wittgenstein’s concept of seeing-as (Philosophical Investigations, 1953).